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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEAM PHYSICIANS AS CO-EMPLOYEES: A PRESCRIPTION THAT
DEPRIVES PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES OF AN ADEQUATE
REMEDY FOR SPORTS MEDICINE MALPRACTICE

MATTHEW J. MITTEN*
Playing-field injuries and related illnesses are an inherent part of
professional sports that are assumed by players. At the major league level,
professional players in most team sports have unionized and have shifted the
costs of medical treatment for these injuries to their respective teams. Players’
unions have collectively bargained for contractual rights that require league
clubs to provide and pay for medical treatment for players’ injuries and
illnesses suffered within the scope of their employment.1
Each club typically selects a local doctor or group of doctors, usually
specialists in orthopedic or internal medicine with expertise and experience in
sports medicine, to serve as its team physician(s).2 Because being a team
physician for a professional sports team is prestigious and often results in a
corresponding increase in non-athlete patients and more overall revenue, many
sports medicine physicians seek to provide medical care to professional
athletes.3 It is not uncommon for a club to receive free or discounted medical
care for its players from its chosen team physicians.4 Such symbiotic
economic relationships may adversely affect the quality of sports medicine
care provided to professional athletes and jeopardize their health if the team’s
need for an injured player’s services interferes with the team physician’s

* Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute, Marquette University Law
School. I want to express my gratitude to Professor Nicolas Terry for inviting me to participate in
this symposium and to Matt Weiss, a third-year student at Marquette University Law School, for
his research assistance in connection with this article.
1. E.g., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 2003–2006 BASIC
AGREEMENT 217, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [hereinafter MLB
AGREEMENT]. The regulations that constitute a part of Major League Baseball’s Uniform Player
Contract provide that the club is responsible for the cost of “reasonable medical and hospital
expenses incurred by reason of [a player’s] injury and during the term of [his] contract or for a
period of up to two years from the date of initial treatment for such injury.” Id.
2. Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete Patients, 50
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 190–91 (2005).
3. Id. at 192.
4. Id.
211
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medical judgment regarding the appropriate treatment and when the player
may safely return to play.
There is a unique relationship among a club, its players, and the team
physician.5 The club seeks to win games and maximize profits, but must
comply with its contractual obligations to the team’s players. The players want
to maximize their on-field performance to help the team win and enhance their
individual economic rewards. Injured players want to return to play quickly,
but they do not want to suffer serious or permanently debilitating health effects
caused by improper medical treatment or by resuming play too soon. The team
physician has the potentially conflicting responsibilities of providing medical
care to the players and protecting their health while also facilitating the club’s
ability to win games by having its best players on the field.
Both the club and its players rely on the team physician’s expertise and
judgment in sports medicine matters. A player generally has a contractual
obligation to submit to medical care and treatment deemed necessary by the
team’s chosen physicians,6 with the right to receive a second medical opinion
from a group of designated medical specialists (the cost of which is paid by the
club).7 Courts recognize that the team physician serves as the “gatekeeper” to
the playing-field and that his or her medical opinion deserves appropriate
deference. As one court explained, “it will be the rare case regarding
participation in athletics where a court may substitute its judgment for that of
the . . . team physicians.”8
A team physician’s “judgment should be governed only by medical
considerations.”9 Although facilitating an injured athlete’s ability to return to
play is one objective, the team physician’s paramount duty should be to protect
5. See Nick DiCello, Note, No Pain, No Gain, No Compensation: Exploiting Professional
Athletes Through Substandard Medical Care Administered by Team Physicians, 49 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 507, 536 (2001). As this commentator has observed:
Professional sports franchises as employers exercise a much greater level of control over
athletes than do employers outside the sports entertainment industry. For example, a
professional athlete may not change employers unless he is traded, and professional
teams, unlike other employers, retain total control over the health of the athletes.
Id.
6. E.g., MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 217. The Basic Agreement states that a
player, when requested by his club, “must submit to a complete physical examination at the
expense of the Club, and if necessary to treatment by a regular physician or dentist in good
standing.” Id. It also provides that “the Club shall have the right to designate the doctors and
hospitals furnishing such medical and hospital services” to injured players. Id.
7. E.g., id. at 45–46 (“[T]he Clubs shall provide an updated, accepted listing of medical
specialists . . . to whom Players may upon their request go for diagnosis and a second medical
evaluation of an employment related illness or injury being treated by the Club physician.”).
8. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Pahulu v. Univ. of
Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Kan. 1995).
9. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS § 3.06 (2004–05).
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players’ health and safety by providing high-quality sports medicine care and
treatment.10 Nevertheless, team physicians encounter competing loyalties and
inherent conflicts of interest. Extreme time-sensitive needs for an injured
player’s services may mean that the physician is pressured by team officials to
place the team’s needs ahead of medical considerations necessary to protect the
player’s health and safety.11 In addition, injured players may be willing to
sacrifice their health by pressuring the team physician to provide medical
clearance for them to return to play.12
Unless statutorily excluded from coverage, a professional team’s players
are “employees”13 who are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for
injuries occurring within the scope of their employment.14 In states in which
professional athletes are covered by workers’ compensation laws, both the
player’s original playing field injury and an aggravated injury caused by the
team physician’s improper medical treatment are compensable injuries.15 A
professional player’s additional or enhanced injury caused by the team
physician’s medical malpractice is compensable because, like the original
injury, it is considered to be sustained in the course of employment.16
In states where professional athletes are covered by applicable workers’
compensation laws, clubs tend to designate their team physician as an
“employee.”17 An employment relationship is established, often at the
insistence of the team physician’s medical malpractice insurer, primarily to
provide immunity from players’ tort suits.18 As a co-employee, the team
physician is immune from tort liability for improper medical care provided to a
10. Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary,
and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 8–9 (2002); see also Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 188–89.
11. Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 192; Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor:
Serving Two (Or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 165, 171 (2005).
12. See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive Athletes: Allocating
Legal Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 133–36 (1993).
13. Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding, as a matter of law,
professional football players are “employees rather than independent contractors”).
14. See generally 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW § 22.04[1][b] (2005) [hereinafter LARSON & LARSON]; Benjamin T.
Boscolo & Gerald Herz, Professional Athletes and the Law of Workers’ Compensation: Rights
and Remedies, in 3 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 17:3 (Gary A. Uberstine et
al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Boscolo & Herz].
15. See, e.g., DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116, 117–18 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (recognizing that improper medical care may fit into intentional injury exception to New
York’s Workers’ Compensation Act); Bayless v. Phila. Nat’l League Club, 472 F. Supp. 625,
629, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff’d mem., 615 F.2d 1352 (3d Cir. 1980); Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills
Football Club, 433 F. Supp. 699, 702 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
16. Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 629–30; Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 372 N.E.2d 842,
844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
17. See, e.g., Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968 P.2d 883, 885 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
18. E.g., id.
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player within the physician’s scope of employment with the club.19 In other
words, a professional athlete is precluded from bringing a malpractice claim
against the team physician for negligent medical care that aggravates or
exacerbates his original injury.20
The developing judicial construction of the co-employee doctrine to
encompass team physicians creates a disincentive to adequately protect
professional athletes’ health and to serve effectively as a “gatekeeper.”
Although workers’ compensation benefits do not provide full recovery for all
harm caused by the team physician’s negligent treatment of a player’s injury
(i.e., the full economic value of a player’s lost wages and pain and suffering),21
most courts hold that these benefits are the player’s exclusive remedy.
In Hendy v. Losse,22 a professional football player sued the team physician
for negligently diagnosing and treating his knee injury suffered during a game
and for advising him to continue playing football, allegedly causing him to
aggravate the injury.23 Dismissing his claims, the California Supreme Court
held that the state’s workers’ compensation law bars tort suits between coemployees for injuries caused within the scope of employment.24 The Court
found that the player and team physician were both employed by the San
Diego Chargers club and that the physician acted within the scope of his
employment by “provid[ing] medical care for injuries that are inherent in the
nature of plaintiff’s employment.”25

19. This legal doctrine, whose parameters vary by jurisdiction, generally provides that
workers’ compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee and
prohibits a tort suit against a co-employee who caused the injury (except for intentional wrongs).
Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“[T]he exclusive-remedy provision bars
an employee from bringing a common-law negligence action against a co-employee.”). See
generally 6 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 14, § 112.02[1][b], at 112-7–112-10.1.
20. The workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine also immunizes the club from
vicarious liability in tort for its team physician’s medical malpractice. Mitten, supra note 10, at
45. In the relatively few jurisdictions where professional athletes are excluded from workers’
compensation coverage and are not barred from bringing tort suits against their employer or coemployees, the team physician is usually designated as an “independent contractor” in an effort to
prevent the club from being vicariously liable for medical malpractice. See DiCello, supra note
5, at 536.
21. Two commentators observe that “[p]rofessional athletes, because of their high salaries,
frequently are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits at the maximum level. The maximum
compensation rates are so low relative to athletes’ salaries that they are not adequately
compensated for their injuries under workers’ compensation.” Boscolo & Herz, supra note 14, §
17:5, at 17-12.
22. 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991).
23. Id. at 3–4.
24. Id. at 12–13.
25. Id. at 3, 13. However, the court stated: “If a co-employee provides medical services
other than those contemplated by the employee’s employment and in so doing is not acting for the
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The player argued that his malpractice action should be permitted because
the team physician’s “duties as a professional are separate from the
employment relationship.”26 However, the Court rejected this contention by
construing the statute to provide only workers’ compensation benefits as the
exclusive remedy against a co-employee who causes injury while acting within
the scope of employment.27 The Court reasoned that the objective of the
workers’ compensation statute is to prevent California employers from being
held directly liable for workers’ compensation benefits and vicariously liable
for tort judgments against its employees.28
Similarly, in Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks,29 a Washington appellate court
held that the Seattle Seahawks’ team physician was immune from a
malpractice suit by one of the players he treated.30 Before 1991, the team
physician was an independent contractor who had a fee-for-service agreement
with the club.31 Thereafter, at the insistence of his malpractice insurance
carrier, the club restructured this relationship and made him a part-time
employee, although he continued to have a private orthopedic practice.32 His
employment relationship stated that he “will be solely responsible for
exercising his independent medical judgment as to all decisions on medical
care and methods of treatment of Seattle Seahawks employees,” but provided
the club with the right to direct and control his duties and working hours.33
Even though the team physician was engaged in the independent
profession of medicine without being subject to the club’s control or direction
when providing medical care to its players, the court ruled that the physician
was immune from tort liability as a matter of law because he was in the “same
employ” as the plaintiff-player.34 In other words, tort immunity existed under

employer, he or she no longer enjoys the ‘immunity’ from suit which section 3601 creates for acts
which are within the scope of employment.” Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Hendy, 819 P.2d at 12.
28. Id.
29. 968 P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
30. Id. at 887–88.
31. Id. at 885.
32. Id. The club paid its team physician an annual salary and provided him with the
necessary office space, tools, and equipment to provide on-site medical services for its players.
Id. It also provided accounting and tax services relating to this aspect of his medical practice, but
did not provide him with health insurance, sick leave, vacation pay, life insurance, or retirement
benefits. Id.; cf. Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 777–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (although team
physician found not to be club employee, case is instructive regarding how to structure
relationship between club and physician so it will be judicially recognized as employment).
33. Daniels, 968 P.2d at 885.
34. Id. at 887–88.
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Washington’s workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine because both
physician and player were employed by the Seahawks club.35
In my opinion, a team physician should not have immunity from
malpractice merely because he or she is characterized as an “employee.”
Whether designated as either an “employee” or an independent contractor, the
same inherent conflicts exist. Regardless of how he or she is characterized, the
team physician has an ethical and legal duty to provide appropriate sports
medicine care and recommendations to the club’s players based solely on
medical considerations. If the team physician breaches this duty, the coemployee doctrine should not provide a shield from tort liability for harm
caused to professional athletes.36 Rather than getting blanket immunity under
state workers’ compensation laws, team physicians should be accountable if
their malpractice causes harm to players whose health and safety are entrusted
to them.
Courts recognize that it is not necessarily unreasonable for workers’
compensation laws to be applied differently to professional athletes than other
employees. For example, excluding professional athletes from workers’
compensation benefits, or providing them with only reduced benefits, does not
As one court observed,
deny them equal protection of the law.37
“[P]rofessional athletes willfully hold themselves out to risk of frequent,
repetitive and serious injury in exchange for lucrative compensation.”38
However, professional athletes suffer greater uncompensated loss than typical
employees when negligent medical treatment exacerbates their playing-field
injuries. Although they voluntarily assume the inherent risks of injury from
playing a sport, professional athletes should not be required to involuntarily

35. Id.; see also Lotysz v. Montgomery, 766 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(holding that the New York workers’ compensation statute barred a player’s malpractice claims
against team physician when he obtained medical treatment “solely by reason of his employment
with the Jets, and not as a member of the general public”).
36. Other commentators advocate this position. See, e.g., Teresa Herbert, Are Player
Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 276 (2000) (“A physician should not
be allowed to treat a player with any less care than he treats his other patients. If he does,
workers’ compensation should not deny a player a right of recourse that is available to any other
injured patient.”); James D. Young, Liability for Team Physician Malpractice: A New Burden
Shifting Approach, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 4 (2003) (“[A]ny notion that a [team] doctor’s coemployee status will shield his liability to a patient he negligently treats should similarly be
removed.”); DiCello, supra note 5, at 536 (“Application of the co-employee immunity doctrine in
this instance encourages less than competent medical treatment because no real threat of liability
influences the physician. An injured professional athlete patient should have the right to the same
claims against a doctor[] as does the injured non-athlete patient.”).
37. Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d 284, 291–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(exclusion from benefits); Lyons v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 803 A.2d 857, 860–62 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) (reduction in benefits).
38. Lyons, 803 A.2d at 862.
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bear the economic costs of aggravated injuries and accompanying pain and
suffering caused by the team physician’s malpractice.
A unique relationship exists between the team physician and a professional
athlete vis-à-vis a company physician and the company’s employee, which
justifies non-application of the co-employee bar to tort immunity in the former
situation. Unlike company physicians, team physicians may encounter
pressure to recommend and/or provide medical treatment that furthers the
employer’s (team’s) immediate need for an employee’s (player’s) services
rather than provide treatment in the best interests of the athlete’s health.
Potential tort liability creates an important legal incentive for the team
physician not to succumb to such pressures, which are inherent in professional
sports.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion in Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings
Football Club, LLC39 illustrates the appropriate limits on judicial application of
the workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine necessary to encourage the
provision of sports medicine care that adequately protects the health and safety
of professional athletes. The court appropriately recognizes that a sports
medicine care provider’s status as a co-employee should not ipso facto confer
tort immunity.40
This case arose out of the 2001 death of Korey Stringer, a former
Minnesota Vikings football player, caused by complications from heatstroke
suffered during the club’s preseason training camp.41 In a wrongful death
action, Stringer’s heirs alleged that several Vikings’ employees, including the
assistant athletic trainer and coordinator of medical services, provided
improper emergency medical care to Stringer when he suffered heatstroke.42
These defendants argued that they were entitled to co-employee tort immunity
under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation statute.43
The court held that co-employees have tort immunity only when carrying
out their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace for its
employees, which is the basis for imposing strict liability for workplace
injuries on employers.44 However, there is no immunity if a co-employee
owes a personal duty of care arising out of his provision of medical care to a
fellow employee that is “not pursuant to the employer’s nondelegable duty to
provide a safe workplace.”45

39.
2005).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

686 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 705 N.W.2d 746 (Minn.
See id. at 549–50.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 548.
Stringer, 686 N.W.2d at 549.
Id. at 550.
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The court ruled that the emergency medical care rendered to Stringer by
the club’s assistant athletic trainer and its coordinator of medical services “did
not involve general workplace safety or the removal of workplace hazards . . .
pursuant to their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.”46
Rather, their conduct gave rise to an independent personal duty that exists
regardless of their co-employee relationship with Stringer.47 The court
explained that “under some circumstances, personal duty may be coextensive
with employment duties. But not every action taken by an employee is in
furtherance of the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe
workplace.”48
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, held that defendants’
“obligations to Stringer directly resulted from their employment by the Vikings
and the Vikings’s efforts to provide a safe workplace for their players.”49
Thus, “any duty they had toward Stringer did not exist absent their
employment status”50 and the defendants are immune from tort liability.51
Two dissenting justices expressed “doubt that a scope of employment test
is workable . . . where the co-employees’ job is to provide [medical] care
directly to employees.”52 In their view, sports medicine care of an injured
athlete is not conduct merely “taken in the performance of the employer’s
nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.”53 They expressed concern
that limiting co-employee liability to acts outside the course and scope of
employment provides tort immunity “essentially coextensive with that of the
employer,”54 although the co-employee does not provide any corresponding
quid pro quo injury benefits as does the employer.
The dissenters also cited the following policy arguments weighing against
co-employee tort immunity: “the injured employee is entitled to be fully

46. Id. at 550–51. In contrast, the court held that another defendant, the club’s head athletic
trainer, was protected by co-employee immunity because his alleged tortious conduct arose out of
the Vikings’ nondelegable duty to ensure safe work conditions for its players. Id. at 551. This
defendant allegedly was aware that Stringer suffered heat exhaustion on July 30 and was
responsible for accurately weighing the players before and after practice to measure their fluid
loss and determine whether it was safe for them to practice, but he did not ensure that these
measurements were accurate and did not prevent Stringer from practicing on July 31, the day he
suffered heatstroke. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 762 (Minn. 2005).
50. Id.
51. The Minnesota appellate court held that the defendants are not subject to tort liability
because their conduct was not grossly negligent, which is the co-employee liability standard
established by the Minnesota workers’ compensation statute. Stringer, 686 N.W.2d at 551–52.
52. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 767.
53. Id. at 763.
54. Id. at 767.
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compensated for his injuries by all but the employer; the co-employee
tortfeasor should not be relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing;
extending immunity to the co-employee would encourage fellow employees to
neglect their duties[.]”55
To establish a uniform rule not dependent on varying judicial
interpretations of state workers’ compensation laws, the players union should
insist on a provision in the league collective bargaining agreement requiring
that team physicians be designated as independent contractors rather than club
employees. Removing the unwarranted protection conferred by co-employee
tort immunity would enable a professional athlete to seek full recovery for
harm caused by the team physician’s negligent care and treatment of his
injuries. It would not impose strict liability on team physicians for sports
medicine care that aggravates a player’s preexisting injury or necessarily mean
that the team physician had committed medical malpractice in such cases. To
establish liability, the player would have the burden of proving that the team
physician’s medical recommendations or treatment deviated from reasonable,
customary, or accepted sports medicine care and proximately caused his
aggravated injury.56
It is fair to assume that, in most instances, the team physician provides
appropriate sports medicine care to the club’s players despite pressure to
provide treatment that enables a professional player to return to play as quickly
as possible. Physicians who serve in this capacity generally are very skilled
and reputable clinicians who have significant professional and economic
incentives to provide high quality sports medicine care to the team’s players.
Failing to do so may result in a highly publicized malpractice lawsuit by a
professional athlete, which likely will adversely affect the physician’s private
practice and increase the cost of malpractice insurance. Obtaining second
opinions from medical specialists not directly affiliated with the club also
should reduce instances of improper medical recommendations and care by the
team physician.
Nevertheless, when the team physician fails to provide appropriate medical
care and thus causes aggravated injury and diminished playing skills, a
professional athlete should have a tort remedy to recover for the lost or reduced
economic value of his career, as well as other damages to compensate for harm
such as pain and suffering. Even if a professional athlete may recover
workers’ compensation benefits for an aggravated injury caused by medical
malpractice, these benefits do not provide full compensation for the team
physician’s independent tortious conduct. To avoid double recovery for the
harm caused by negligent medical treatment, it may be appropriate to reduce a
professional athlete’s tort judgment against the team physician by the amount
55. Id. at 764.
56. Mitten, supra note 10, at 8–13.
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of workers’ compensation benefits received as a result of any aggravated injury
caused by the team physician’s medical malpractice.57
To avoid liability for the payment of both workers’ compensation benefits
and tort damages, the club generally should not be vicariously liable for its
team physician’s malpractice. Otherwise, the primary policy justification for
the co-employee tort immunity doctrine—namely, employer strict liability for
workplace injuries in lieu of vicarious liability for employee torts that injure
fellow employees—would be undermined.58 Holding the club vicariously
liable, which is a form of strict tort liability, might encourage lay club officials
to attempt to direct and control the treatment that the team physician provides
to injured players. This undesirable consequence could inhibit the team
physician from independently exercising his or her medical judgment and
result in treatment that adversely affects an injured player’s health.
On the other hand, to create an incentive to ensure that professional
athletes will receive appropriate sports medicine care, the club should be
directly liable for its own negligence in connection with the hiring or retention
of its team physician.59 The club should also be liable for interfering with its
team physician’s medical judgment or exercising substantial control over
medical treatment that causes aggravated harm to an injured player.60 To avoid
57. For a general discussion of the “collateral source rule” and its abolition or limitation in
various jurisdictions, see 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 380, at 1058–61 (2001).
58. As one court explained, this doctrine has another policy basis: “[L]ike the employer, a
co-employee is involved in a compromise of rights; among employees, the quid pro quo is that
each employee surrenders his common law right to bring tort actions against other employees in
return for immunity to their tort suits.” Deller v. Naymick, 342 S.E.2d 73, 76 (W. Va. 1985). It
is relatively infrequent that professional players tortiously injure team physicians, so this is not a
major concern. However, to further the objective of maintaining reciprocal rights among
employees, it would be appropriate to allow the team physician to assert tort claims against the
team’s players.
59. However, a professional sports team has a strong incentive to select well-qualified team
physicians to provide medical care to its players to protect its substantial economic investment in
them.
60. See, e.g., Krueger v. S.F. Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding NFL club and team physician liable for fraud in connection with medical treatment
rendered to injured player that caused permanent knee injury); Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey
Club Ltd., 124 D.L.R.3d 228, 232–33, 253 (B.C. Ct. App. 1981) (finding NHL club liable for
influencing injured player’s medical treatment and requiring him to continue playing, which
caused disabling spinal cord injury, and finding player to be 20% contributorily negligent for
continuing to play and failing to use reasonable care to protect his health). Alternatively, one
commentator recommends that there be a rebuttable presumption that the club is jointly liable for
damages if the team physician negligently treated an athlete. Young, supra note 35. He asserts
that by “shifting the burden to the team to prove it was not controlling the doctor, the team’s
incentive to force injured players to play or to encourage physicians to be less candid regarding
the extent of injuries would be minimized.” Id. The club could escape liability by proving that
its management did not exercise any control over the medical treatment rendered by its team
physician. Id.; see Wilson v. Vancouver Hockey Club, 5 D.L.R.4th 282, 290 (B.C. 1983)
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the prospect of double recovery for the same harm, the player must elect to
receive either workers’ compensation benefits or to pursue a tort claim.61

(finding NHL club not vicariously liable because its management did not exercise any control
over team physician’s negligent treatment of its player).
61. Major league professional athletes typically have contractual injury protection
guarantees that require their respective clubs to pay their full salary for the season in which their
injury occurs. Major League Baseball players and National Basketball Association players may
have multi-year guaranteed contracts that require full payment of their salaries if they are unable
to play because of an injury suffered within the scope of their employment. E.g., MLB BASIC
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 28. Any tort judgment against the club should be reduced by the
amount of these contractual payments.
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